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The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) needs to focus on attaining short term counterinsurgency effects and balance that with long term goals. This can be achieved by understanding CERP's impact on the COIN campaign and its impact on Government of Afghanistan's priorities. Requiring commanders and CERP managers to get buy-in with our Afghan partners at the beginning of the process will allow for a smooth transition of government functions back to the Afghans. A training program to help facilitate this process is critical to its success. The process will only work with a whole of government approach, with representatives available at all steps of the process to facilitate better program outcomes. Fixing past errors and providing better oversight and more training focusing on outcomes versus spending will provide the effects we need to be successful.
Commander's Emergency Response Program: An Effects Based Approach
You must know something about strategy and tactics and …logistics, but also economic and politics and diplomacy and history. You must know everything you can know about military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the important problems of our time have…been finally solved by military power alone.
-President John F. Kennedy impacting program oversight at all levels. This inability to complete CERP projects prompted Congressional leaders to question CERP's importance and threaten cuts in funding. To address this concern, it became more important to get a project on contract and obligated in the finance community, than to gain the maximum effect from the project. Larger projects became the norm because they obligated more funds.
Commanders throughout the organization had the best intentions, but as CERP's execution lagged, the pressure mounted to spend. One critic of how the program is managed is the Department of Defense Inspector General. Over many years, his analysis of the program has been very critical of its management. Reviewing these 2 findings, along with the history of the program and lessons learned, is crucial to designing a path forward to achieve the desired effects of CERP.
Purpose of CERP CERP in its current state is a commander's program. The program is designed to give commanders a tool to address causes of instability in their areas of operations.
This tool is in the form of money that can be used on projects within the local area.
These projects, when executed properly, are intended to foster good will between the populace and coalition forces. As an added benefit, projects can also shed a positive light on the government of the supported nation. Legitimizing the host nation government, ensuring greater COIN effect, and delegitimizing the insurgency are ultimately the effects of CERP projects can have.
Counterinsurgency Operations
Money has the ability to shape the battlefield. With the advent of CERP, commanders have greater ways and means to accomplish their ends. It is important in COIN for the CERP program to be used to meet not just the military goals, but also the civilian goals. What is important is understanding what our COIN doctrine expects in terms of the civilian / military integration. The U.S. Army Counter-insurgency Manual states: "Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population." 2 The Army Counterinsurgency Manual dedicates an entire chapter to this civilian / military integration. Unity of Effort, chapter two, discusses the principles that CERP managers and commanders need to consider to effectively implement COIN Strategy.
The four key principles are: understanding the roles and capabilities of United States 3 and the Host Nation; including our partners with special attention given to the host nation in planning at all levels; providing support to civilian efforts, in particular nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) whose programs may complement our goals in the region; and focusing on political, social, and economic programs versus military operations. 3 The goal is to work together in our civilian / military roles to stabilize the situation, leveraging each other's strengths and expertise. When security is inadequate or civilian capacity is not available, military forces should be prepared to bridge the gap until civilian capacity can come online.
CERP provides a tool to this end. Military organizations need to have the expertise to fill these civilian shortfalls and understand the larger goals in their region to make CERP effective.
In COIN, it is always preferred for civilians to perform civilian tasks with local authorities receiving special preference. 4 However, security is a prerequisite to bringing in civilian capacity, whether that is from the State Department or the Host Nation. COIN Strategy requires that leaders understand how to orchestrate their efforts so that both the military and civilian goals can be achieved. Coalition warfare also adds a new dynamic in that our allies bring different capabilities to the fight. It is important to understand what all our partners bring to the table in terms of COIN to maximize the effect of our operations. Commanders at all levels need to create mechanisms for this coordination to take place. Commanders should invite both formal and informal local leaders, when planning COIN operations, to get buy-in from the populace and to help build legitimacy for the Host Nation. The best way to achieve buy-in from the local population and the local authorities is through their inclusion in our decision making processes. The captured funding could not last forever so a request for more funding was attached to the Global War on Terrorism supplemental appropriation request by Central
Command, seeking CERP funding authority. Congress provided the authority for CERP in the amount of $180 million. These funds were divided up into $140 million for Iraq and $40 million for Afghanistan. Congress also wrote in the language that these funds only be used in a deployed environment, more specifically, they were only to be used in Iraq and Afghanistan. Congress also lifted the language that required the use of the Federal Acquisition Regulations to place projects on contract. 11 This allowed CERP agents to write contracts without a federal warrant, which gives contracting officers the 7 authority to enter contracts on behalf of the United States. These changes to appropriation law mirrored the original rules of the captured funds and allowed for a seamless transition to appropriated CERP in theater.
The new appropriation brought Congressional oversight that did not previously exist. This increased reporting requirements and theater oversight by Resource
Managers. The funds also became tied to the supplemental process, with funds running short or not being available due to Congressional inaction. These funds were There was a shorter process for HCA called "de minimus" 13 funding, which was for projects under $10,000. These projects didn't require interagency reviews but needed to go to CENTCOM for approval. 14 There was also a limited amount of these funds available and they were normally planned out in advance for a global engagement strategy. If a unit in theater saw an urgent requirement for the use of HCA funds they would have to go through many layers of approval to receive only $10,000. This showed a shortfall in capabilities with no apparent funding mechanism available to address it.
Some units in Afghanistan used the "de minimus" approach to use assets to help the local population when HCA funding was not available. Commonly this would be the use of life saving equipment or supplies to stabilize a patient until help arrived.
When it came to funding projects much like CERP, the "de minimus" concept could be used for small amounts of Operation and Maintenance Funds or equipment or supplies, but the scope would be much narrower than CERP would allow and the dollar amounts would be small. When I was working in United States Army Special Operations
Command, we developed a process to get approval of " The commander approves projects within his or her approval authority and These sectors have five themes that the country is trying to achieve. These are gender equality, counter narcotics, regional cooperation, anti-corruption, and environment.
When compared to the State Department's goals they are very consistent with one another. We need to be cognizant of what the Afghan's hope to achieve. This will facilitate buy-in and transfer of programs to the GOA.
CERP for Effects
The functional objectives that provide appropriate metrics for assessing the effects we seek to achieve in Afghanistan, include rebuilding Afghanistan's agriculture, strengthening Afghan governance, enhancing Afghan rule of law, supporting Afghan-led reintegration, combating the Afghan narcotics trade, and building the economic foundation. The fusion cells also provide a tool to coordinate our activities within the CERP arena. CERP projects should be gauged on how well they achieved their COIN effect (short term) and how well they helped us realize these six objectives (long term).
A member of Afghan Integrity Watch provided the following comments concerning U.S. To do this well, we need to rethink the skill sets of our officer and noncommissioned officer corps. The U.S military should encourage our personnel to take courses in local universities on economics, agriculture, contracting, and project management to name a few examples. The Army's patch chart provides a window in which mobile teams can train units on country specific aspects that would provide CERP managers insight on how to achieve the desired effects. Current trends in the Middle East (with the Arab Spring) and in Africa show we have to prepare our soldiers better for the complexities they will face during deployment. Training and Doctrine
Command should consider developing courses to educate non-civil affairs personnel on these principles. These courses could be incorporated into the current professional development programs or as stand-alone courses to build a deeper bench.
Needed Authorities
Continued CERP authority is necessary to fulfill global expectations that the having this authority in the U.S. Code, comptrollers and contracting officers will be better prepared to execute these programs on short notice and proper planning and training considerations will take place prior to combat or stability operations.
Measuring Effects
The current CIDNE system tracks programs from start to finish but does not report whether or not the desired effects were achieved. As the mission in Afghanistan winds down, a review of projects should be done where practical and relevant to determine if projects achieved their long term desired effects. We need to reflect so that we don't repeat the same mistakes in the future. The Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) may be positioned to provide critical and unbiased insight into the program. This needs to be done while we still have the troops to provide security for the assessment teams. The Center for Army Lessons Learned needs to interview people involved in CERP to capture what happened so that information is available to the next generation of Army leaders. The theater needs a database of lessons learned and best practices by category that can be searched by CERP managers when planning projects. This system should also incorporate a tool for asking questions or requesting technical assistance on projects. This could be a way to pool limited subject matter expertise in theater or around the world.
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Conclusion CERP was created because there was an urgent need to do HCA in theater.
Military leaders need to learn from our experiences with CERP and train our future leaders so they can be effective in a domain that should be dominated by civilian capability. The military in the past did not expect to have to do these civilian requirements but must be prepared to do so in the future when warranted. CERP gave us an ability to affect the populace, especially when there was no civilian counterpart to assist. Given security realities in failed states, the military will have a larger role. We need to build relationships prior to deploying with USAID personnel to facilitate our understanding of their capabilities. To accomplish this in the future, USAID should train with us so we can build that unity of effort that is critical in a COIN strategy. Until such time that a true unity of effort can be achieved and properly resourced, we need to remain vigilant on all the aspects of national power to achieve our ends. CERP was one of the effective tools to achieving those ends in Iraq and has great potential for achieving victory in Afghanistan.
Endnotes 1 John F. Kennedy, "Remarks at Annapolis to the Graduating Class of the United States Naval Academy," 7 June 1961, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project (Santa Barbara: University of California, Santa Barbara), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8181.
